The NASA Launch Services Program investigators have finally figured out the technical root of the failure of both OCO and Glory missions in 2009 and 2011.

NASA's Orbiting Carbon Observatory mission in 2009 and Glory mission in 2011 both failed after they hadn't reached orbit and broke up on reentry into the Earth's atmosphere when payloads failed did not separate from Taurus XL rockets.

Altered Test Results

NASA's LSP investigators discovered that the missions' failure was due to the faulty materials provided by aluminum manufacturer, Sapa Profiles, Inc. SPI is now known as Hydro Extrusion Portland, Inc., and its company parent is Hydro Extrusion USA, LLC, formerly known as Sapa Extrusions Inc.

With the cooperation of the U.S. Department of Justice and NASA's Office of the Inspector General, a resolution of civil claims and criminal charges was filed against SPI. A $46 million payment agreement was also granted to the United States government and other commercial customers of the company.

SPI has altered test results regarding the aluminum extrusions used in the payload fairing rail frangible joint in both Orbiting Carbon Observatory mission in 2009 and Glory mission in 2011. Aside from that, the company has also provided false certifications to Orbital Sciences Corporation, the manufacturer of the Taurus XL.

The investigation has also uncovered that the materials fraud of SPI is part of a 19-year fraud scheme done not only to NASA but to hundreds of other customers as well.

The court documents stated that SPI has admitted to modifying the results of the tensile tests designed to make sure of the reliability and consistency of aluminum extruded at the companies' Oregon-based facilities.

Tensile testing includes gradually extending and afterward tearing a sample of metal with the use of a machine, which then evaluates the force applied to the sample at each stage of the test.

Court documents also stated that the SPI employees agreed to become involved in the stated malpractices in order to hide the unsteady quality of aluminum extrusions produced by the company, boost the financial yields of the company, avoid several production delays, and to receive bonuses that were in part based on a production metric.

Government-Wide Debarment

"NASA relies on the integrity of our industry throughout the supply chain. While we do perform our own testing, NASA is not able to retest every single component. That is why we require and pay for certain components to be tested and certified by the supplier," said Jim Norman, NASA's director for Launch Services at NASA Headquarters in Washington.

Norman added that more than $700 million worth of damages were incurred because of the failure of the Taurus XLs for the OCO and Glory missions. That is the reason why NASA felt violated because the agency deems it critical to be able to trust its industry partners to certify that all materials they provide are in accordance with NASA's required standards.

To protect the government supply chain, NASA suspended SPI from government contracting. The exclusion has been in effect since Sept. 30, 2015. NASA also proposed that SPI should be subjected to government-wide debarment.

Currently, the company is excluded from contracting throughout the federal government.